Hegel, Antigone, and Women by Kain, Philip J.
Santa Clara University
Scholar Commons
Philosophy College of Arts & Sciences
2002
Hegel, Antigone, and Women
Philip J. Kain
Santa Clara University, pkain@scu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/phi
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Kain, P. J. “Hegel, Antigone, and Women,” Owl of Minerva, 33 (2002): 157-177, which has
been published in final form at http://doi.org/10.5840/owl20023328.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts & Sciences at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact rscroggin@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation










When Hegel turns to a treatment of culture in Chapter VI of the Phenomenology— as anyone who has
read his early writings would expect[1]—he begins with the ancient Greek polis.   There the human spirit
first fully emancipated itself from nature as it had not, in Hegel’s opinion, in Egypt; yet it was still in
perfect harmony and balance with the natural.  In Hegel’s view, this was an age of beauty that produced a
social community and an ethical life where citizens were free and at home.  What is a bit surprising,
though, is that in the Phenomenology  Hegel does not begin his treatment of the ancient world with the
heroes of Homer, the philosophers of Athens, or even with the general cultural perspective of men.  He
starts, in the section entitled “The Ethical Order,” with Antigone and the perspective of women.  It is
quite true that the perspective of Antigone and of Greek women is constructed from the perspective of
men, the perspective of Sophocles and of Hegel himself, nevertheless, it is still rather surprising that
Hegel begins with Antigone.
What does this mean?  Could it mean that when we arrive at Greece, quintessentially the land of the
master, Hegel insists on beginning with the slave?  Is it fair to see Antigone as like the Hegelian slave? 
Many scholars—for example, Mills, Ravven, O’Brien, and Oliver—reject such a notion.[2]  Nevertheless,
Antigone is subordinate to Creon and does  end up subverting him—much as the slave does the master.  If
we admit that women are like the slave, this would tend to suggest that while dominated and oppressed
they will ultimately subvert the master, emerge as an equally significant principle, and move us toward a
higher development of culture.[3]  Could Hegel really be suggesting this sort of thing about women?  We
will be pushed toward such a conclusion if we decide that Antigone is like the slave. 
But the question as to why we begin with Antigone is even more complicated than this.  Oliver argues
that, after the section on the Ethical Order, women are simply left behind in the Phenomenology— they
are never resuscitated and are not preserved in later stages of the dialectical movement.[4]  I think that
without a doubt women are not preserved or resuscitated adequately  in the later stages of the
Phenomenology,  or in Hegel’s thought in general, but I do not think that they are simply and completely
left behind.  Earlier, in Chapter V of the Phenomenology,  Hegel took up a discussion of the Sittlichkeit of
the ancient polis  in order to contrast it to the sort of Moralität  that had developed in the modern world. 
Moralität begins with Socrates[5] and reaches its high point in Kant.  Moralität  is rational and reflective
morality.  Individuals must themselves rationally decide what is moral and do it because  reason tells
them that it is the right thing to do.  On the other hand, Sittlichkeit  is best represented, for Hegel, in the
Greek polis  before the rise of Socratic Moralität.  Sittlichkeit is ethical behavior grounded in custom and
tradition and developed through habit and imitation in accordance with the laws, religion, and practices of
the community.  For Sittlichkeit,  morality is not something we ought  to realize, or something we ought 
to be, as it is for Moralität.   For Sittlichkeit,  morality exists—it is.   It is already embedded in our
customs, traditions, practices, character, attitudes, and feelings.  The objective ethical order already exists
in, is continuously practiced by, is actualized in, the individual.  What we see as we proceed in Chapter
VI, however, is that ancient Sittlichkeit  left little room for individuality and that, as individuality began to
arise, it caused the collapse of the ancient community and its ethical life.  Moreover, it is Hegel’s view
that the individuality connected with Moralität,  as it develops in the modern world, produces a rational,
autonomous, and enlightened individualism, an individualism that sets out to remake its world in
accordance with its rational principles, but an individualism that in the French Revolution goes too far
and becomes radically destructive.  Hegel wants to overcome this extreme form of individualism, but not
simply by returning to ancient, undeveloped Sittlichkeit.   He wants for the modern world a synthesis of
ancient Sittlichkeit  and modern Moralität— of community and individuality. 
At any rate, Antigone represents the principle of individuality which in Hegel’s view subverted the
undeveloped Sittlichkeit  of the ancient community and led to its collapse.  In so far as Antigone is
associated with this principle of subversion and the development of individualism, then, it will be difficult
to deny her contribution to cultural development.  Nevertheless, Hegel is not after a destructive form of
individualism for the modern world, certainly not of the sort that caused the French Revolution.  He is
after an individualism that is compatible, and can be synthesized, with Sittlichkeit.   While Antigone does
represent the sort of individualism that subverted the inadequate Sittlichkeit  of the ancient world,
nevertheless, her individualism is not like the destructive individualism that Hegel wants to overcome in
the modern world.  Her individualism, I suggest, at least prefigures and would be resuscitated in the sort
of individualism that would make possible a modern synthesis of Sittlichkeit  and Moralität— and that is
why Antigone is so important for Hegel.
We must notice from the start that Hegel’s conception of individualism is quite different from the
individualism of the liberal tradition.  Individuals, for Hegel, are not natural, they are not just given, they
do not come ready-made, we do not just find them there in a state of nature as for Hobbes or Locke. 
Individuals are constructed by their sociocultural world.  Nevertheless, this construction may involve
conflict—individualism may even cause the collapse of culture as it did in the ancient world and again in
the French Revolution.  Hegel’s goal is to get beyond this destructive form of individualism to an
individualism formed by, in harmony with, and reinforcing the institutions of our sociocultural world.
Thus we must distinguish between two important forms of individualism.  Moreover, I would like to
suggest that both of these forms of individualism are at least prefigured in the section on the Ethical
Order; they are prefigured in the two principles that are the foundation of the ancient world:  the Human
Law and the Divine Law.  The first has to do with citizens, males, and their public activity in society for
the community and its government.  This individualism centers around warfare, wealth, property,
economic interest, and so forth.  Hegel says, “The acquisition and maintenance of power and wealth” that
is involved here “belongs to the sphere of appetite…”[6]  This is the form of individualism that
Antigone’s brothers possess.  I do not want to suggest that this is already liberal individualism.  It is still
embedded in Sittlichkeit  and thus quite the opposite of liberal individualism.  Nevertheless, it involves an
appetite for and an interest in power and wealth, and, as the ancient Sittlichkeit  of which it is part
collapses and as it develops in the modern world, it will come to be centered in civil society and thus
develop as a part of liberal individualism.[7]  Moreover, there is a certain tension between this form of
individualism and the family, both in modern civil society[8] as well as, we shall see, here already in the
ancient polis.   Hegel does not want to eliminate this form of individualism, he wants to allow it a place,
but it must be contained so as not to be destructive.
The second form of individualism is prefigured in the Divine Law and Antigone represents this form
of individualism.  It does not involve a radical standing alone, apart, in a state of nature.  It is true that the
individualism of her brothers, still embedded in Sittlichkeit,  does not involve such standing alone either. 
But Antigone’s individualism does not even involve individual appetite for power, wealth, or personal
glory in warfare.  Her individualism, rather, is manifested in and through acting in perfect solidarity with
the family, religion, and tradition.  This is the key, I think, to why Hegel is so interested in Antigone and
why Antigone is so important. 
The modern Sittlichkeit  that Hegel is after stands in need of a form of individualism very much like
Antigone’s.  Her individualism is the sort that allows a self embedded in a context of cultural relations,
institutions, and common customs, traditions, and practices to develop an individual identity.  Since we
are all formed and shaped by our culture, if we are to become individuals and at the same time avoid the
sorts of vagaries associated with what we have come to call cultural relativism, we need a solid identity,
in Hegel’s view, an absolute identity.  Individuals must have the sense that they are right, that while they
act within a particular community, tradition, or culture they do more than simply act in accord with
personal appetites, private interests, or with whatever their particular community, tradition, or culture
happens to value.  They must be able to think (as all Europeans have been able to think) that they as
individuals are contributing to something objectively important, that the Divine or the Absolute is acting
through them, or at least that they are acting in accord with the Divine or the Absolute, that it is their
destiny to realize some objective truth or good, or something of the sort.  This is the form of identity that
Antigone has and represents.  It is an identity embedded in the local and particular, within which,
however, the individual is able to find an absolute reality, importance, and truth.  It is a form of
individualism that is not only compatible with religion, culture, and Sittlichkeit,  but derives from them. 
At any rate, Hegel wants a balance here.  Too much liberal individualism in the modern world gave us
the French Revolution, chaos, destruction, and the loss of an absolute identity.  Not enough liberal
individualism in the ancient world gave us the closed world of immediacy found in the Greek polis.  
Hegel wants a balance and harmony between ancient Sittlichkeit  and modern Moralität,  a balance that
was at least prefigured in the balance between Divine Law and Human Law, and, we must also see, in the
balance between male and female. 
For Hegel, the latter are two essences.  And the authentication of one occurs through the other (PhG 
278/250).  This is to say that neither “of the two is by itself absolutely valid.…This equilibrium can, it is
true, only be a living one by inequality arising in it, and being brought back to equilibrium by Justice”
(PhG 276-7/248-9).  What are we to make of this rather obscure statement?  I think it does indicate that at
least in this section of the Phenomenology  Hegel is not engaged, as O’Brien suggests, in history’s most
ambitious attempt to define humanity as simply masculine.[9]  But, on the other hand, it does not seem to
me either that Hegel is simply arguing for equality  between the sexes, as Ravven seems to suggest.[10] 
Let us begin to examine this section in detail.
 
-II-
The two main institutions of ancient Greece were the family and the community (or polis )—and they
were intimately related in a self-reinforcing circle.  The family provides men to the community.  They
serve in the political and governmental sphere and most importantly in war.  The family raises children
who as young men go off to fight war to defend the community.  Reciprocally, the community, for its
part, protects and preserves the family.  It protects individuals and their families from the enemy, and in
peacetime it organizes and fosters property which makes possible the substance and subsistence of
families.[11] 
Each institution serves the other and each would be impossible without the other.  The community
owes its very existence to families and its fundamental purpose is to defend and make the good life
possible for members of families.  And families, for their part, could not defend themselves or prosper
without the community which they must in turn serve.
However, warfare is not engaged in solely as a means to protection.  For young men it is also an
escape from the confines of the family and an arena in which to achieve virtue and gain public honor. 
And from its perspective the city must see to it that citizens do not get too deeply rooted and isolated in
their concerns for property.  From time to time the citizens must be shaken to their roots by war.  They
must be made to serve the highest concerns of the community.  As Hegel puts it, they must be “made to
feel in the task laid on them their lord and master, death” (PhG 272-3/246).  On the one hand, the family
is protected by warfare; on the other hand, it loses its members to the community and they die in war—the
family is both preserved by the community and destroyed by it.  Even this death, however, links the
family and the community.  Death is the highest service the individual undertakes for the community, and
the individual’s burial is the highest duty of the family (PhG  271/245).  Individuals die for the
community and are buried by the family—they are honored by the community and mourned by the
family.
Proper burial is most important in Greek culture.  In the Odyssey,  we see that Odysseus had to return
to bury one of his men who otherwise could not have entered the underworld and found peace.[12] 
Moreover, the individual cannot simply be abandoned to the natural and to decay.  The burial ceremony is
caught up with the need to preserve, remember, and recognize heroic virtue—Patroclos’s burial ceremony
lasts for 12 days in the Iliad. [13]  The individual must be made to live on in the memory of the family
and the community.
In this ideal Sittlichkeit,  then, these two fundamental institutions, the family and the community, each
preserve and produce the other—each confirms and substantiates the other.[14]  The spiritual or cultural
world is a product created by the action of each and constitutes their unity (PhG  264/239).  Human Law
and Divine Law, in this ideal, are supposed to reinforce each other harmoniously. 
As we have seen, however, Hegel says, “This equilibrium can, it is true, only be a living one by
inequality arising in it, and being brought back to equilibrium by Justice” (PhG  276-7/248-9).  And,
indeed, these two laws soon come into disequilibrium—a disequilibrium that needs to be restored by
justice.  Hegel takes up two classic examples that he finds in Sophocles.  The first is Oedipus, who saves
the city of Thebes, becomes its ruler, and rules well.  His actions are in perfect accord with the Human
Law.  However, he violates the law of the family, the Divine Law, in the worst possible way, by
murdering his father and marrying his mother.  He does this in ignorance, but he does it nevertheless
(PhG  283/255).  Divine Law takes its vengeance on Human Law by producing a plague in Thebes.
The second case is that of Antigone.  This time we get a conflict between the two laws that is
intentional.  Antigone has two brothers—Eteocles and Polyneices.  As would be typical, at a certain age
they leave the home for the community, for politics and government, while their sister remains in the
home.  Eteocles, it turns out, becomes ruler of the city and Polyneices attacks it.  Both die.  The city
recognizes Eteocles, its ruler, and condemns Polyneices, who attacked the city, as an enemy and a traitor
—which seems to be in perfect agreement with Human Law.  Creon, the new ruler, accords burial honors
to Eteocles and refuses them to Polyneices.  This is not acceptable, however, to Divine Law.  Divine Law
does not recognize such distinctions; both brothers are equally members of the family and Antigone must
bury both—even the one who attacked the city (PhG  285-6/257).
Here, the community and the family are no longer in harmony.  Why does this occur?  How does the
conflict arise?[15]  From the beginning there has been a basic tension between the community and the
family.  The community, after all, draws the family member out to war and to death, thus destroying the
family and breaking its happiness.[16]  We have here a living equilibrium that will inevitably give rise to
such inequalities, inequalities that must be brought back to equilibrium by justice.  Thus it is bad enough
that the community draws the family member out to war and to death, but for Creon to refuse to bury
Polyneices is to go too far.  For Antigone, Creon’s action on behalf of the city is not justice, it is not the
restoration of equilibrium, it certainly cannot represent a universal moral principle, it is an outrage.  It can
only be, in her view, the perverse decision of this particular individual (her uncle Creon) against another
particular individual (her beloved brother Polyneices).  So Antigone attacks, derides, ridicules Creon’s
action, and asserts that the commitment to her brother demanded by Divine Law is more important than
the Human Law of the community, all of which seems in perfect agreement with Divine Law.  The
community, for its part, naturally tries to suppress Antigone and what it sees as her individualism, but in
doing so only feeds it and creates an enemy in women (PhG  288/259).  Antigone’s action fractures the
substantial unity of the ethical order.
 
-III-
What, then, can we say about Hegel’s attitude toward Antigone, women, and their equality with men? 
It is certainly the case that women are excluded from political life in the polis.   Moreover, the role of
women certainly seems to be established by nature or as part of a fixed essence.  And furthermore, the
possibility that women might have interests other than the family never even arises.[17]  At the same
time, though, it is just not the case that Antigone is locked away out of the real order of things.  She is
excluded from the realm of Human Law, but the Divine Law is every bit as real, significant, and
important.  In fact it is more primordial and ultimately more powerful—indeed, it finally triumphs (PhG 
273/246).
While there is no way that Hegel is going to cut a figure as an acceptable modern feminist,
nevertheless, we would be wrong, I think, to assume that he simply sides with Creon, the community,
government, and Human Law against Antigone.  Furthermore, we cannot let our reading of the
Philosophy of Right,  written 15 years after the Phenomenology,  lead us to project things back into the
Phenomenology  that are not there.  I do not wish to argue that in all respects the two texts differ—or that
there are two Hegel’s—but the texts clearly do differ on some issues.  For example, Hegel has been called
the official philosopher of the Prussian state for his supposed glorification of the state in the Philosophy of
Right. [18]  While I think this is an incorrect reading even of that text, nevertheless, we should notice that
the Phenomenology  is notably free from anything resembling such glorification of the state.[19]  There is
certainly no glorification of the Greek state.  If anything, I would say that Hegel sides with the subversive
Antigone against Creon.  Moreover, we find that much of this same negative or critical attitude toward the
state will continue throughout the rest of Chapter VI of the Phenomenology.   We see this in the way that
Hegel treats State Power, Noble and Base Consciousness, and the Heroism of Flattery, all of which lead
up to the French Revolution’s overthrow of State Power, a process with which Hegel has a certain
sympathy despite his opposition to the destructive individualism involved.  If it is impossible in the
Phenomenology  to saddle Hegel with the view of the state that he will supposedly hold in the Philosophy
of Right,  if Hegel is more critical of the state than he will be in the Philosophy of Right,  there should be
nothing wrong with being very careful before we attribute to the Phenomenology  the negative views of
women that we will find in the Philosophy of Right.
Quite clearly, the Philosophy of Right holds a more conservative view of women than does the
Phenomenology.   In the Philosophy of Right,  the family must  have as its head the husband (PR 
116/249).[20]  Moreover, Hegel holds that while women are capable of education they are not made for
the advanced sciences which demand a universal faculty.  Also when women hold the helm of
government, the state is in jeopardy, since women are not regulated by the demands of universality but by
arbitrary inclinations and opinions (PR 263-4/247).  In the Phenomenology,  on the other hand, it is
explicitly the case that the man is not  the head of the household, “the wife remains, the head of the
household and the guardian of the divine law” (PhG  275/248).  Moreover, in the Phenomenology,  men
and women, at least as brother and sister, are equal (PhG 288/259).  It is true, though, that husband and
wife are not equal.  From this fact, however, we cannot conclude—as Tuana does—that the community
and the Human Law, to which the husband belongs, is superior to the Divine Law and the family, of
which the wife is guardian and head.[21]  That is not Hegel’s view.  For Hegel, neither has any advantage
over the other—they are equally essential (PhG  285/256).  While it is true that women are confined to the
family, it is also true that the Greek family, unlike the modern family, was the fundamental economic unit
of society—it was the basic unit of production and produced for itself all that it needed.  To be the head of
such an institution could not be, and was not considered, insignificant.[22]
The view of women found in the Phenomenology  is definitely not as objectionable as that found in
the Philosophy of Right.   Nevertheless, I do not at all want to suggest that the Phenomenology  treats
women as sufficiently  equal—or that it even approaches what would be acceptable.  In fact, I want to
argue against an interpretation of Hegel that would tend in that direction.  Some commentators seem to
think that Hegel’s conception of love implies equality between men and women.  One certainly cannot
deny that love and recognition are central and important categories of Hegel’s thought.  If it can be shown
that love requires, necessitates, or even pushes toward equality, then my claim that Hegel does not believe
in equality between men and women would be in question.  Thus we must consider Hegel’s view of love.
In Chapter VI, Hegel says, “the relationship of husband and wife is…the primary and immediate form
in which one consciousness recognizes itself in another, and in which each knows that reciprocal
recognition.”[23]  In the Philosophy of Right,  Hegel also says,
 
Love means in general terms the consciousness of my unity with another, so that I am not in
selfish isolation but win my self-consciousness only as the renunciation of my independence and
through knowing myself as the unity of myself with another and of the other with me.…The first
moment in love is that I do not wish to be a self-subsistent and independent person and that, if I
were, then I would feel defective and incomplete.  The second moment is that I find myself in
another person, that I count for something in the other, while the other in turn comes to count for
something in me.…love is unity of an ethical type (PR  261/237-8).
 
In love I am confirmed and recognized by the other.  I am real and significant in so far as I exist for-
another.  In an earlier text, Hegel said that each intuits themselves in the being of the other consciousness
and thus has a communal existence with the other.[24]  Indeed, Baillie suggests that in Chapter VI of the
Phenomenology  Hegel is following Aristotle’s treatment of friendship in Books VIII and IX of the
Nicomachean Ethics  (PhM  465).  It is clearly Aristotle’s view that friendship or love is what holds the
polis  together.  In fact, friendship is more important than justice in this respect, since friends treat each
other better than justice would demand and it would be far worse to harm a friend than someone else.[25]
I want to be quite clear, then, that I do not ignore love or dismiss it.  In fact, I agree with
commentators like Williams and Westphal about the importance and centrality of love for Hegel’s
thought.  On the other hand, though, I am not convince that love will give us the equality that these
commentators seem to think it will.  According to Williams, “Love seeks a union with its other, in which
domination and subordination are out of place.  Love allows the other to be, i.e., it seeks the freedom of
the other.”[26]
While love is quite compatible with equality, as between brother and sister, love certainly does not
require equality.  Love is perfectly compatible with inequality.  Let me be as clear about this as possible
—so as not to be misunderstood.  I certainly think that in a relationship between a man and a woman
equality is desirable.  I also think that the relationship will be a better relationship if it is one of equality.  I
also think that love is a valuable and desirable thing.  But I simply do not think that there is anything
about love which demands, requires, or necessarily works for equality in a relationship.  I do not think
that love and equality are necessarily related.  I think it desirable that a loving relationship also be one of
equality, but just as a relationship of equality need not involve love, so we can perfectly well have love
without having equality.  To think that love and equality necessarily or normally go together is to
romanticize love—to expect something of it which it is not.  We can easily love someone we consider our
inferior or our superior—God, our dog, the King or the Queen, our children, our parents.  For centuries,
men have been loving their wives while thinking them their inferiors—and I have no reason to believe
that many of these men did not really  love their wives—certainly not  because there is any
incompatibility between love and inequality.  Certainly those relationships would have been improved by
equality; but I see no reason to think that the love as love  would necessarily  have been deepened or
made truer.  Love and equality are just different things.  There is nothing about loving someone that one
considers an inferior that necessarily  distorts the love.  Love can be perfectly true love when it is love of
an equal, a superior, or an inferior.  Certainly, Aristotle did not think that love implied equality when he
claimed that it was what held the city together.
Friendship, on the other hand, is a bit different.  It does not require complete  and perfect  equality.  It
is possible to be friends with someone from a very different social class or economic level, or with
someone with a very different level of intelligence or athletic ability.  But these inequalities will rub
against the friendship.  For the friendship to succeed, the friends will at least have to carve out an area in
which they can relate to each other with relative equality.  A poor person is not likely to feel comfortable
spending a lot of time at their rich friend’s country club and may well be harmed by the experience; so
also the wealthy person will likely find it difficult hanging out in the inner city.  On the other hand, the
two could carve out an area of equality and become very close friends at the university, in the army, on a
sports team, on the job, or perhaps even when engaged in the activities of citizenship in a community. 
Aristotle also thinks economic inequality will erode friendship.[27]  Friendship, then, differs from love. 
Love does not require equality.  We can perfectly well love someone without considering them our equal
socially, politically, economically, intellectually, athletically, or in a host of other ways.  On the other
hand, husband and wife, besides being in love, could also be friends.  If so, they too would have to carve
out an area of equality, and thus friendship could be a force for equality in their relationship.  But they
need not be friends.  They could simply be in love, and I think it is relatively easy to love someone that is
in no way considered an equal and it is not necessary to carve out an area of equality around which to
build the relationship.  It is certainly not necessary in loving children.  And in the past men have had no
difficulty in loving women they in no way considered their equals.  In fact, such inequality often works to
endear women to men.  This can obviously become quite demeaning and thus it is very important to build
equality into such relationships.  It is just not the case, however, that there is anything about love that
pushes for such equality.  The equality has to be brought in from outside the love.
The question, then, is whether Hegel recognizes that love does not require equality.  I think he clearly
does recognize this in the Phenomenology.   It is only the relationship of brother and sister that is a
relationship of equality.  The relationship of husband to wife, which is obviously a relationship of love, is
not one of equality.  In an earlier text, the System of Ethical Life,  Hegel explicitly held that the husband
was the master.[28]  Hegel does not actually make this claim in the Phenomenology.   He does say,
however, that the son is “lord and master of the mother who bore him…” (PhG  288/258-9).  If that is so,
it would be hard to imagine that Hegel would not also take the husband to be lord and master of his wife. 
In the System of Ethical Life,  Hegel also makes a much more direct and explicit connection between the
relationship of lordship and bondage and the relationship between the sexes in love, marriage, and
property.  They are all treated within a span of 30 pages as part of a complex developmental sequence.
[29]  Indeed, Hegel says outright:  “the lordship and bondage relation…while this relation is only
something qua apparent and external, is the [patriarchal] family.”[30]  In the Phenomenology,  the master-
slave dialectic is separated by more than 200 pages from the section on the Ethical Order where relations
between the sexes, love, family, and property are discussed.  Nevertheless, we must notice the
connection.  We must see that in the Phenomenology  too, woman, like the slave, is dominated and man is
the master.  Hegel is explicit in holding that the community, the sphere of males, suppresses the family
and women: 
 
Since the community only gets an existence through its interference with the happiness of the
Family…it creates for itself in what it suppresses and what is at the same time essential to it an
internal enemy—womankind in general.…The community, however, can only maintain itself by
suppressing this spirit of individualism, and, because it is an essential moment, all the same
creates it and, moreover, creates it by its repressive attitude towards it as a hostile principle (PhG 
288/258-9).
 
The claim that the two principles—the Human Law and the Divine Law, the sphere of the masculine
and the sphere of the feminine—are equally essential is not at all incompatible with the claim that women
are dominated and oppressed by men.  After all, even the master dominates and oppresses the slave while
the slave is just as essential to human development as the master.  Like the master-slave dialectic, then,
the male community dominates women; this creates in women an enemy and it feeds the development of,
the progress to, a new reality—in this case individualism.  Moreover, again like the slave, the woman
subverts the master.  She sees the universal end of government as a mere private end and sees its universal
activity as the work of a particular individual.  She ridicules its wisdom—the fact that it cares only for the
universal.  She makes the state the laughing-stock of youth and unworthy of their support.  The state’s
continued suppression only feeds her hostility and spreads her message.
To summarize, then, in “The Ethical Order” and in “Lordship and Bondage” we have three parallel
steps that are quite similar.  In “The Ethical Order,” (1) from the start, family and community, Divine
Law and Human Law, are taken to be mutually dependent and equally essential.  Then, (2) a conflict
arises between Divine Law and Human Law, and the community (which was always more powerful)
comes to dominate the family and suppress women.  The fact that the community and the family are in
themselves equally essential is not incompatible with one coming to dominate the other—certainly not for
one to take itself to be an authority over the other in certain types of cases.  Finally, (3) Antigone as
representative of the family subverts the authority of the community.  The parallel to “Lordship and
Bondage” is near perfect.  (1) There too we start with two self-consciousness that are mutually dependent
and equally essential.  Each exists, Hegel says, only in being recognized by the other, and one is no more
important than the other, indeed, they are virtually identical (PhG  111-3/109-11).[31]  Certainly, one
does not dominate the other at this stage.  Then, (2) the two engage in a conflict that ends up with a
master dominating a slave.  Then, (3) the slave subverts the master.  Thus, in both  cases we start with
mutual dependence and equal essentiality, then there develops the domination of one over the other, and
then the dominated subverts the dominator.[32]
It seems to me that we must admit that we do have a situation in “The Ethical Order” that is similar to
the master-slave dialectic.  The question is whether Hegel himself would agree?  We have seen above that
in the System of Ethical Life  he himself connects lordship and bondage with the patriarchal family, but
what about in the Phenomenology?   The upshot of Antigone’s action is that the ancient community
dissolves and we are left, as we see in the next section (“Legal Status”), with individuals facing a
powerful and estranged governmental force that stands over and dominates them—Hegel calls this force
the “lord and master of the world” (PhG  290-2/260-2).  On the other hand, individuality develops, Hegel
says, as the divine law emerges from an inward state into actuality—personality steps out of the life of the
ethical substance.  Hegel parallels this to his treatment of Stoicism earlier in the Phenomenology  and says
that just as Stoicism “proceeded from lordship and bondage, as the immediate existence of self-
consciousness, so personality has proceeded from the immediate life of Spirit, which is the universal
dominating will of all, and equally their service of obedience” (PhG  290/261).  It seems to me that even




Where are we to stand when we read the section on Antigone?  How are we to react to it?  Are we to
side with Antigone or against her?  Benhabib and Shklar, for example, seem to think that Hegel has
written an apologia for Creon.[33]  If we were to decide that Hegel is a simple sexist and the philosopher
of the Prussian state, then we would probably conclude that he expects us to dismiss Antigone and side
with Creon.  But how can we do that?  Antigone represents an equally essential  principle.  What she does
is right— it is in full accord with Divine Law.  It is the state that in repressing her brings about its own
collapse.  And the master must be subverted—that is the only way we progress to a higher principle. 
Antigone, after all, develops an important form of individualism.   
Clearly the Antigone story is a tragedy.  And tragedy for Hegel means the conflict of two principles
both of which are right.[34]  It means that both  sides are justified—not just Creon, not just the state, not
just men.  Tragedy means the collapse of the great, the master, the whole ethical world.  It also means the
emergence of a higher moral principle.  If the Antigone story is to be a tragedy, and it is, we cannot side
with the state and dismiss Antigone in sexist fashion.  If we do, we destroy the tragic element.
However, there is also something besides tragedy going on in the last part of Hegel’s treatment of
Antigone.  In the Aesthetics,  Hegel explains comedy, especially Greek comedy, as a situation in which
subjectivity has the upper hand.  Comedy occurs in a world in which man is master, a world that destroys
itself by its own folly, and that thus dissolves in laughter.[35]  In the Phenomenology, Hegel’s view is that
woman is the “everlasting irony in the life of the community” and she brings it down by making it a
“laughing-stock.”[36]  We might say that from the perspective of the male master, the collapse of the
community is tragic.  But from an equally important perspective, the perspective of woman—the slave—
the collapse is comic.[37]  And it seems to me that both  of these perspectives are important for Hegel. 
Certainly women are being treated seriously here.  Women are suppressed and like the slave subvert
the master.  And this is positive, desirable—it allows individualism to emerge.  Subversion allows us to
move to a higher principle.  Moreover, if we decide that woman as the enemy of the state is to be taken
seriously, positively, then we may even wonder whether we should read in a somewhat different way
Hegel’s claim in the Philosophy of Right  that the state is in jeopardy when led by a woman.  Perhaps—at
least at times and even for Hegel—that is a good thing.  Likewise, when we recognize Antigone’s
hostility to the universal ends of government and her commitment to the particular and individual, we
may also want to read in a different way the claim in the Philosophy of Right  that women lack a universal
faculty and are not regulated by the demands of universality.  Perhaps—at least at times and even for
Hegel—that too is a good thing (PR  263-4/247).
Does this mean that we can rehabilitate Hegel as an acceptable modern feminist?  No, that is not
possible.  Hegel does not argue for the full equality of women and he holds too many objectionable
views.  Despite this, some feminists—like Ravven, O’Brien, Starrett, and Brown—find that he has
positive contributions to make.[38]  I think that despite Hegel’s intentions there is a valuable conceptual
possibility present in his thought—one that he does not or will not develop for women, but which
nevertheless is there for our appropriation.  I have argued elsewhere that no system empowers the
oppressed or the marginalized as does Hegel’s.[39]  The Absolute, like the master, claims to be all of
reality.  It denies anything of significance outside itself and marginalizes what it cannot accept.  It must be
everything.  If not, it is nothing—or at least not the Absolute.  And so, as soon as the other can show itself
to be something, something real, something significant, then the Absolute is no longer Absolute—it is not
all  of reality.  This gives the other an extraordinary power to subvert the Absolute and to build a new
Absolute with itself at the center.  Whether Hegel likes it or not, whether he would approve or not, he has
shown us how the oppression of women places them where they can subvert the Absolute and construct a




Isn’t it problematic, though, to say nothing of ironic, to be arguing that because Antigone is like the
slave, therefore Hegel, despite himself, is treating her positively?  Traditionally, women and slaves have
been thought of as mere appendages to their masters.  They are expected not to show independence or
self-determination.  In so far as they assert individuality, self-determination, or autonomy, they act
improperly.  The virtuous woman serves a man, accents him, assists him.  Women cannot assert
independence and be thought virtuous.  Their virtue is defined by their subordination to men. 
To give Hegel credit, I think we must see to what extent he is breaking from this traditional view.  It is
true that for Hegel a woman’s virtue is still confined to the family and the service of men.  It is true that
the slave does not overthrow the master.  Both remain in their allotted role.  But both accomplish
something, both subvert the master, and do so without abandoning their place.  Antigone’s commitment to
the Divine Law never wavers.  To achieve individuality she does not slacken her commitment to the
family.  To achieve self-determination she does not abandon tradition.  She does the very opposite.  She
fulfills her role to the utmost.  She satisfies her obligation to the family, to Divine Law, to tradition—all
with a vengeance.  And thereby she subverts the government and gives rise to a new individualism.[40]
The slave, like the woman, develops individuality and independence through the development of
virtue, the unfolding of inner capacities, through empowerment,  not, like the master, merely through
domination, the exertion of power over of others.  Slavery and service are the true models for virtue—the
unfolding and development of a power within, a real inner capacity.  Hegel’s general view, as he puts it in
the Philosophy of History,  is that it is “not so much from  slavery as through  slavery that humanity [is]
emancipated.”[41]
Antigone’s individualism, then, is not at all like liberal individualism; it does not involve the sort of
freedom that one finds in a state of nature, the liberty to act upon particular and selfish interests or
desires.  It is an individualism compatible with family, religion, and tradition.  It is Human Law, society,
and men that are out of line and that eventually are subverted.  If they could finally be brought into
harmony with this different sort of individualism, then it would be Antigone who had given Hegel the sort
of principle that he needs, a principle of harmony between individuality, self-determination, and
autonomy, on the one hand, and community, tradition, and embeddedness in relations, that is, with
Sittlichkeit,  on the other hand.  And some would say that this principle is a feminine  principle.  It is
Antigone, then, that prefigures what Hegel is ultimately after, an individualism that is compatible with
and finds its identity in the family, tradition, and religion, which, together with a compatible political
community, could hopefully temper the destructive individualism of civil society and allow a modern
Sittlichkeit  to emerge, a Sittlichkeit,  moreover, that while embedded in concrete and particular customs,
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